100 JURISDICTION [APPEALS]
101 General
It is not dispositive for appeal purposes whether a personnel transaction fits or does not fit within the definition of a particular type of transaction. The Commission must examine the practical effect the transaction has on the employe's employment status, in the context of the employer's intention in effecting the transaction, and the policy factors which underlie the statutory framework of the civil service, to determine whether the transaction partakes more of the nominal category of personnel transaction, e.g., a reprimand, or more of the more serious category, e.g., a suspension. Rodgers v. DOC, 98-0094-PC, 1/27/99
Implied powers may be found only if they are clearly necessary for the implementation of a statute. Seay v. Wis. Pers. Comm., Dane County Circuit Court, 93-CV-1247, 3/3/95; aff’d Ct. of App., 95-0747, 2-29-96.
Whether there should be statutory protections is a legislative, not a judicial determination. Seay v. Wis. Pers. Comm., Dane County Circuit Court, 93-CV-1247, 3/3/95; aff’d Ct. of App., 95-0747, 2-29-96.
An appellant is not barred from proceeding with an appeal before the Commission because of a potentially inconsistent legal assertion made to the employer and not before this Commission. Krasny v. DOC, 94-0036-PC, 11/17/95
102.01 General application of time restrictions
Complainant is charged with receipt of a written notice of his discharge when he actually received it, rather than the later date of when he opened the envelope. Magel v. UW-Madison, 98-0167-PC-ER, 1/27/99
Filing a claim with another entity, albeit a state or federal agency, does not constitute filing with the Personnel Commission. The Commission declined to recognize complainant's earlier filing with the Equal Rights Division as timely on either the basis of "good faith" or "share agreements," citing Ziegler v. LIRC, 93-0031-PC-ER, 5/2/97. Swenby v. UWHCB, 98-0012-PC-ER, 5/20/98
Untimely filing of an appeal usually deprives the Commission of "competency" to hear the appeal. Austin-Erickson v. DHFS & DER, 97-0113-PC, 2/25/98
Under certain circumstances, a failure to comply with §230.44(3) will not be fatal to an employe's ability to pursue an appeal. The most common circumstance leading to this result is when an agency responsible for the personnel transaction in question misleads the employe as to the nature of his or her appeal rights, and the employe, reasonably relying on this information, fails to file a timely appeal. Austin-Erickson v. DHFS & DER, 97-0113-PC, 2/25/98
Section 230.44(3), Stats., statutorily limits the jurisdiction of the Commission to hear appeals to those appeals filed within 30 days of the effective date or of the employe's notification, whichever is later. Byrne v. State Pers. Comm., Dane County Circuit Court, 93-CV-3874, 8/15/94
Lack of familiarity with the law does not toll a filing period and the lack of information from an employer does not toll the filing period unless the employer has an affirmative obligation to provide such information. Hallman v. WCC & DOA, 96-0146-PC, 2/12/97
While the failure to comply with the time limit in §230.44(3), Stats., does not deprive the Commission of subject matter jurisdiction, but rather its competency to proceed, the time limit is mandatory rather than discretionary. Where appellant failed to comply with the mandatory timeliness provision, the Commission lacked competency to proceed and the appeal was dismissed Stronach v. DOT & DER, 95-0177-PC, 12/7/95
Appellants failed to sustain their burden of proof of establishing that they received notice of a reallocation on or after August 1, when they only made a vague statement to the effect that the notices were mailed to them late in July or early in August. Lawrence & Wermuth v. DER, 94-0443-PC, 1/20/95
Effective notice ordinarily can be verbal unless there is a specific requirement in the civil service code for written notice, citing Kelling v. DHSS, 87-0047-PC, 3/12/91. Varney v. DOA, 94-0283-PC, 12/22/94
An objection to the untimely filing of an appeal cannot be waived by a party, citing PC 1.08(3), Wis. Admin. Code. Heath & Mork v. DOC & DER, 93-0143-PC, 6/23/94
Where there was nothing in a document signed by the appellant at the time he submitted his training/experience questionnaire which expressly or impliedly waived his right to challenge the examination process pursuant to §230.44(1)(a), the appellant did not waive his right to appeal the exam. Chaykowski v. DOD & DMRS, 91-0136-PC, 10/17/91
The Commission simply had no power to consider appellant's claim that, in a personnel transaction occurring seven years earlier, his constitutional rights were violated. The state statute establishing the time limit for filing does not conflict with a federal constitutional provision merely because appellant has argued that the transaction involved the violation of that constitutional provision. Schroeder v. DMA, 86-0148-PC, 8/20/86; affirmed (dictum) by Fond du Lac Circuit Court (dictum), Schroeder v. State Pers. Comm., 86-CV-717, 1/21/87
The phrase "any appeal filed under this section may not be heard" in §230.44(3), Stats., applies only to appeals involving the subject matter set forth in §230.44, Stats., and not to appeals or charges of discrimination filed under §§230.45(l)(b) and 111.375(2), Stats., rather than §230.44, Stats. Sprenger v. UW-Green Bay, 85-0089-PC-ER, 1/24/86
The Commission does not have the discretion to hear an untimely appeal. The reference to "may not be heard" in §230.44(3), Stats., does not grant permissive or discretionary authority. Acharya v. DHSS, 81-296-PC, 10/1/81
Time limit for filing appeals set forth in §230.44(3), Stats., is mandatory and not directory and is jurisdictional in nature. Richter v. DP, 78-261-PC, 1/30/79
102.02(1) Receipt of letter
Where appellant’s appeal was filed late most likely due to a combination of her waiting until close to the end of the appeal period to mail her appeal and of post office delays, and there was no evidence that the DOA mailroom failed to process the mail during the relevant period pursuant to the normal twice daily schedule, her appeal was dismissed as untimely filed, distinguishing Bouche v. UW & DER, 96-0095-PC, 10/29/96. Tukiendorf v. DATCP & DER, 96-0165-PC, 2/12/97
A complaint was found to have been untimely filed where there was no evidence in the Commission's files of ever having received the complaint around the time it was allegedly filed, complainant alleged he had mailed the complaint to the Commission by registered mail and also delivered it by hand several days later when he had heard nothing from the Commission, but he was unable to produce any of the registered mail receipts from the postal service, and, although he produced his own handwritten note memorializing his alleged personal delivery of a copy of the complaint to the Commission, once it was determined from his work records that he could not have delivered the letter on the date stated in the note, he testified that he actually had delivered the copy of the complaint to the Commission the day after he stated in the note. Paul v. DOC, 91-0074-PC-ER, 8/23/93
A letter directed to the Division of Merit Recruitment and Selection which raised a series of questions regarding the respondent's application form and job announcements and asked for a "written, logical explanation to these quirks in the certification process" did not serve as an appeal of a decision not to include the appellant's name on a certification list. Although the Personnel Commission was listed as one of six persons or agencies being sent copies of the letter to DMRS, there was nothing on the record indicating the Commission had received the letter until more than 2 months later and the letter gave no suggestion that at the time it was written, the appellant sought to commence a formal appeal with the Commission. Stockli v. DMRS, 91-0189-PC, 11/14/91
Letter of appeal was not timely received where appellant received civil service examination results on March 24, mailed a certified letter to the Commission at its correct address on April 19, where the postal service erroneously delivered the letter to the Department of Revenue on April 23 and where the letter was not received by the Commission until April 25, after the 30 day appeal period had run. Van Rooy v. DMRS & DILHR, 84-0062-PC, 7/19/84
The Commission lacks jurisdiction over appeal mailed to the Commission within 30 day period specified in §230.44(3), Stats., but not received until after 30 days, as term "filed" requires physical receipt by commission. Richter v. DP, 78-261-PC, 1/30/79
102.02(2) Time stamp
The appellant failed to sustain her burden of establishing she filed her appeal on August 16th where the appeal bore a date stamp of August 17th and there were defects in appellant's credibility and defects in the scenarios advanced by the appellant. Black-Radloff v. DER, 90-0353-PC, 3/25/91
Evidence of subsequent tests involving 35 documents which were mailed from Milwaukee on Friday and were received by the Commission on a Monday was an insufficient basis for concluding that a letter of appeal, which bore a date stamp of Tuesday, August 7th was actually received on Monday, August 6th. Krahling v. DER, 90-0315-PC, 2/26/91
Where the appellant merely asserted that it was his "expectation" that his appeal was received on or before August 6th because he had mailed the appeal on August 2nd, there was no basis for a finding that the date stamp of August 7th was erroneous. Krahling v. DER, 90-0315-PC, 1/11/91; rehearing denied, 2/26/91
The Commission concluded that an appeal was filed on January 7th even though the letter bore a Commission date-stamp of January 8th, where the appellant testified that she had hand-delivered the letter to the Commission on the 7th. The Commission was impressed by the appellant's testimony that she was well aware of the importance of the 30 day time limit and noted that the Commission's office practice of stamping documents on the date of receipt was not infallible. Young v. DP, 81-7-PC, 6/3/81
102.02(3) Mailing date
The language of §801.15(5), Stats., which adds 3 days to a prescribed period for taking some action or initiating some proceedings, is inapplicable to the 30 day period for filing an appeal with the Commission because ch. 801, Stats., only applies to circuit court proceedings. Krahling v. DER, 90-0315-PC, 1/11/91; rehearing denied, 2/26/91
The Commission lacks jurisdiction over appeal mailed to the Commission within 30 day period specified in §230.44(3), Stats., but not received until after 30 days, as term "filed" requires physical receipt by commission. Richter v. DP, 78-261-PC, 1/30/79
102.02(5) Mistaken appeal to the Administrator/ Secretary (see also 102.10)
Appellant did not meet her burden of proving she filed a timely appeal from the decision to deny her reclassification request where her letter of appeal was received by the Commission 4 days late. The reclassification denial notice had advised appellant that if she wished to "appeal this decision to the Personnel Board, you must do so in writing, within 30 days of your receipt of this memo." A cover letter to the notice suggested that if appellant had any questions, she could contact either of two people, but appellant instead took the suggestion of an unidentified person and wrote a letter of appeal to the Department of Employment Relations, where it was received within the 30 day filing period. DER then wrote the appellant and directed her to file any appeal with the Personnel Commission. Casper v. UW & DER, 96-0013-PC, 6/28/96
Where respondent provided correct appeal information on the notice of reallocation but, due to appellant's confusion as to agency organization, he mistakenly filed a letter of appeal with DER but an appeal did not reach the Commission until after the 30 day time limit, the appeal was untimely. After receiving the misdirected appeal, DER had sent the appellant a second letter which referred him to the information in the original notice. Ancel v. DER, 91-0117-PC, 10/17/91
The Commission lacks jurisdiction over an appeal addressed to a DER employe that was received by the Commission outside of the 30 day time limit. The letter had been received by DER within the 30 day period, but the employe to whom the letter was addressed was on vacation. On her return from vacation, the DER employe had hand-delivered the letter to the Commission. Gensch v. DER, 87-0072-PC, 7/8/87
102.04 No notice, generally
The respondent agency has no legal requirement to advise an employe as to the proper route for appeal. Equitable estoppel only occurs when the agency provides misinformation that the employe relies on and thereby fails to file a timely appeal. Austin-Erickson v. DHFS & DER, 97-0113-PC, 2/25/98
An appellant cannot be charged with the duty to have inquired into the nature of the information provided as part of the certification prior to the time that the appellant knew (via the notice of his nonselection), or apparently had any reason to suspect, an adverse employment action against him. Therefore, an appeal of that point of the certification process that resulted in the appointing authority receiving a random-ordered list of names as a certification (without scores) was timely where it was filed 13 days after appellant received notice of his non-selection. To the extent the appellant sought to appeal the promulgation of the certification policy (i.e. providing the certification list in random order), the appeal was untimely because it was filed more than 2 years after the policy became effective and there was no indication that appellant was entitled to any special notification of the promulgation of the policy. However, to the extent the policy had an adverse effect on an employe in a specific transaction, each such certification made pursuant to the policy is appealable as a separate transaction. Thompson v. DMRS & DNR, 87-0204-PC, 6/29/88
Where respondent had no responsibility of notifying the appellant, a union steward who had no involvement in the transaction, of the reclassification of a position, an appeal filed more than 30 days after the effective date of the transaction was untimely. Barker v. UW & DER, 88-0024-PC, 4/20/88
An unsigned carbon copy of a suspension letter provided appellant with "notice" of the suspension as required by §230.34(i)(b), Stats., where there were no circumstances which raised a reasonable question as to whether the unsigned letter was genuine or was final. The 30 day appeal period commenced on the date the appellant received the unsigned letter. Hansen v. DATCP, 87-0092-PC, 10/7/87
Where the appellant was never provided written notification of the final decision to reclassify appellant's position to the MIT 3 level, and the personnel rules require written notification of reclassification/reallocation approvals and denials, her appeal of the decision was timely. The letter of appeal was received on April 9, 1985. On February 15, appellant received an initial written notification of the decision to reclassify her position from PA 4 - Confidential to MIT 3 and of the right to appeal to the Commission. Appellant was then notified, in writing, that the payroll processing of the reclassification would be held up until the question of creating a MIT - Confidential series could be explored. The appellant was notified verbally, but not in writing, that the new series would not be created and that payroll processing of her reclassification would proceed. Kriedeman v. UW & DER, 85-0048-PC, 10/23/85
Where the subject matter of the appeal involves an alleged omission, or failure to inform, and where there is nothing to suggest that the appellant would or should have had knowledge of the specific omission at the time it occurred, he cannot be charged with "notice" of the omission at the time it occurred. The appeal concerned the alleged failure to have informed the appellant before his appointment that the training program required exposure to MACE. Hebert v. DHSS, 84-0233-PC, 4/12/85
102.05(1) Discharge/termination
The appellant did not engage in some trick or artifice to avoid receipt of a notice of job abandonment where appellant absented herself from her home for a period of 5 weeks, instructed her children to put the mail addressed to the appellant in a drawer during her absence, had no way of knowing during her absence that the subject letter had been sent by the respondent or received at her home, and took possession of the letter almost immediately upon her return home. The appellant did not receive effective notice of the respondent's personnel actions until she took actual possession of the letter. Smith v. DHSS, 88-0063-PC, 2/9/89
Notice of appellant's termination was not effective until appellant actually received it two days after appellant's daughter had signed the receipt for delivery of the termination letter. Goers v. DOR, 82-101-PC, 7/8/82
102.05(3) Layoff
Nothing in the statutes or administrative rules requires that the written layoff notice set forth appeal rights. Blomquist v. DATCP, 94-1032-PC, 5/26/95
102.05(4) Grievance matters (see also 102.13)
A grievance arising from the alleged failure of respondent to grant appellant premium pay for overtime hours he worked in a certain capacity during the period from 1985 to 1991 was timely only with respect to the single instance during which he worked in that capacity within the 30 days prior to filing his grievance. Each of the instances in which appellant was not granted premium pay for working overtime hours represented a discrete and separable transaction, so a continuing violation theory was inapplicable. The Commission went on to dismiss the timely claim because pay issues are non-grievable. Bornick v. DOC, 91-0084-PC, 4/1/92
The 30 day time limit set forth in §46.06(1), Wis. Adm. Code, for filing a first step grievance is not jurisdictional but is in the nature of a statute of limitations that is subject to waiver. Flannery v. DOC, 91-0047-PC, 2/21/92
Respondent's failure to have raised a timeliness defense at any of the first three steps in the grievance procedure acted as a waiver of the defense where the appellant's counsel had served as the appellant's representative at all four steps of the process and it was reasonable to conclude that the appellant had incurred expense at each step because of this representation. Flannery v. DOC, 91-0047-PC, 2/21/92
The 30 day time limit in §ER 46.07(2), Wis. Adm. Code, for filing fourth step grievances with the Commission is akin to a statue of limitations and is subject to waiver by the respondent or to equitable tolling. Masear v. DILHR, 89-0065-PC, 11/1/89
The language of §ER 46.06(4), Wis. Adm. Code, which permits reliance on the date of postmark for determining the timeliness of a grievance is inapplicable to the fourth step in the non-contractual grievance process. The time limit for filing at the fourth step is governed by §ER 46.07, Wis. Adm. Code. Masear v. DILHR, 89-0065-PC, 11/1/89
Where the appellant's attorney did not draft the fourth step grievance or mail it until the 30th day after service of the decision at the third step and did not anticipate that the fourth step grievance would arrive at the Commission until after the 30th day had passed, there was no basis for tolling the 30 day time limit and the grievance was dismissed as untimely filed. Masear v. DILHR, 89-0065-PC, 11/1/89
An appeal under §230.45(l)(c), Stats. is untimely where appellant failed to comply with the 15 day time requirement established by the agency's grievance procedure. Lyons v. DHSS, 79-81-PC, 7/23/80; affirmed by Dane County Circuit Court, DHSS v. Wis. Pers. Comm., 80-CV-4948, 7/14/81
The time limit for filing appeals of non-contractual grievances pursuant to §230.45(l)(c), Stats., is, in the absence of the promulgation of rules by the Secretary, DER, as set forth in the individual agency grievance procedures. However, these time limits are not jurisdictional in nature and the DOT time limit here was held not to require dismissal where the circumstances were such as to give rise to understandable confusion as to what time limit applied. Bartol v. DOT, 79-309-PC, 4/25/80
Time limits expressed in agency non-contractual grievance procedures are directory and not mandatory and are non-jurisdictional and can be waived. Wing v. UW, 78-159-PC, 4/19/79
102.05(6) Post-certification action related to hiring process -- §230.44(1)(d), Stats.
If a person is denied a promotion, the "action" appealed from is the denial, not a later event stemming from it. Cozzens-Ellis v. Wis. Pers. Comm., 155 Wis. 2d 271, 455 N.W. 2d 246, (Court of Appeals, 1990)
Nothing in the civil service code requires written notice of nonselection. Varney v. DOA, 94-0283-PC, 12/22/94
Appellant's appeal of a decision by respondent that appellant's purported permanent appointment was actually a limited term appointment was untimely, where she did not appeal within 30 days of receipt of correspondence advising her of management's decision, which was effectuated retroactively. Appellant contended that she did not have effective notice of the decision because after she received the notice she "notified her superior of her belief that she was a full time, permanent employe," and refused to sign an "attached Limited [Term] Employment Request/Report." Appellant's refusal to accede to respondent's decision did not negate her notice of it. Nehls v. DHSS, 92-0844-PC, 6/25/93
Appellant's appeal of an August, 1990 negative employment reference was untimely filed where it was not filed within 30 days of the date of the reference and the claim did not arise out of the same occurrence or transaction set forth in a discrimination complaint appellant had filed in 1989. The negative reference was a discrete action which, in order to be cognizable under §230.44(1)(d), was required to have been the subject of a specific filing with the Commission, either as an original complaint, as an amendment to an original complaint, or as a separate appeal within 30 days of its occurrence. Seay v. DER & UW-Madison, 89-0082-PC-ER, 92-0855-PC, 3/10/93
Because §ER-Pers 12.08 requires a letter of appointment that sets forth an employe's starting salary, if the employer changes the starting salary, this also must be in writing. Kelling v. DHSS, 87-0047-PC, 3/12/91
Where respondent failed to render a decision on appellant's add-on pay prior to or at the time of appellant's appointment despite appellant having raised the issue with respondent at that time, an appeal filed within 30 days of when the respondent's decision relating to add-on pay was communicated to the appellant was timely filed. Coulter v. DOC, 90-0355-PC, 1/24/91
Where appellant, after having gone through the interview process, was notified on July 3rd that he had not been selected for a vacancy and he subsequently learned that the position may have been filled by a transfer candidate not on the certification list, his August 14th appeal to the Commission was untimely, citing Cozzens-Ellis v. Pers. Comm., 155 Wis. 2d 271, 455 N.W. 2d 246, (Court of Appeals, 1990). Marquardt v. DPI, 90-0349-PC, 1/11/91
In order to be sufficient, notice must be "clear, definite, explicit and unambiguous," citing 58 Am.Jur. 2d Notice 32. In an appeal from a decision not to reinstate, the appellant did not have notice of the action where a letter to the appellant was consistent with the notion that her application was on file, that respondent had taken no action on it and that reemployment was conceivable should respondent decide at some point to exercise its discretion to that end. DuPuis v. DHSS, 90-0219-PC, 10/18/90
In an appeal of the starting rate of pay, the appellant did not have notice of the action for purposes of §230.44(3), Stats., until he received a letter from the business administrator setting forth the basis for the salary rate change. Earlier notices simply notified the appellant that his salary rate would be different than he had been advised initially by respondent. Based on those notices, appellant had no way of knowing whether that change was attributable to a clerical error or to some other reason that would not need to, or could not, be appealed to the Commission. The Commission's decision in Bachman v. UW, 85-0111-PC, 11/7/85, was distinguished. Kelling v. DHSS, 87-0047-PC, 5/30/90
The subject matter of an appeal under §230.44(1)(d), Stats., was the decision not to promote the appellant rather than the decision to promote someone else. Therefore, in determining the timeliness of an appeal, the effective date of the decision is the date of the failure or refusal to promote the appellant. Cozzens-Ellis v. UW, 87-0085-PC, 9/26/88; affirmed by Dane County Circuit Court, Cozzens-Ellis v. Wis. Pers. Comm., 88 CV 5743, 4/17/89; affirmed, 155 Wis. 2d 271, 455 N.W. 2d 246, (Court of Appeals, 1990)
In dicta, the Commission noted that the appellant would not have effective notice of a second appointment decision if his information was based only on rumor or office gossip and where the respondent had sent the appellant written notice of his nonselection for an immediately preceding nonselection decision. Thornton v. DNR, 88-0089-PC, 1/12/89
In an appeal of the examination and selection process for a vacant position, the appellant was the party asserting jurisdiction and seeking relief and, therefore, had the burden of establishing the Commission's jurisdiction over the matter. The Commission found the more credible evidence favored the conclusion that the appellant had failed to file his appeal within 30 days after he received notice of his nonselection. Allen v. DHSS & DMRS, 87-0148-PC, 8/10/88
Where appellant contended that on September 16th she learned that disparaging remarks were made about her by a member of the interview panel for a vacant position, appellant's appeal of the decision of the panel not to select her for the vacancy was timely because she learned of her non-selection on October 16th and filed an appeal on November 5th. The alleged negative remarks were considered to be a part of the selection process (leading up to the non-selection decision) that cannot and does not need to be separately appealed but could constitute a part of appellant's case seeking to show that the non-selection decision was illegal or an abuse of discretion. Darnill v. DHSS & DMRS, 87-0194-PC, 5/5/88
To the extent the appellant sought to challenge exam content and administration per se pursuant to §230.44(l)(a), Stats., his appeal was untimely where it was filed more than 30 days after the appellant received notice of the exam results. However, to the extent that the appellant contends that the exam process facilitated the certification and ultimate appointment of an allegedly pre-selected candidate, evidence relating to that contention would arguably be relevant in a non-selection appeal under §230.44(l)(d), Stats., and the operative date for purposes of such an appeal would be the date the appellant received notice of his non-selection. Allen v. DHSS & DMRS, 87-0148-PC, 2/12/88
Appeal of reduction in starting pay from the rate announced in the Current Opportunities Bulletin was untimely where it was filed more than 30 days after the appellant was notified of both his appointment and the new rate of pay and more than 30 days after the appellant's appointment to the position was effective. Newberry v. UW & DER, 87-0066-PC, 9/10/87
Respondent failed to meet its burden of proof of showing that complainant was notified of the non-selection decision before September 23, 1984, where respondent established that, on September 10, a secretary typed and mailed a notification letter but the complainant denies having received the letter and averred that he first became aware of the decision via a September 27th telephone call. Ames v. UW-Milwaukee, 85-0113-PC-ER, 9/17/86
Appellant, who was asthmatic, had sufficient information to have put him on notice as to respondent's chemical exposure training requirement when in an orientation speech, the training center director informed the trainees about the chemical exposure and cautioned them not to wear contact lenses. Therefore, appellant's appeal filed more than 30 days later and alleging an abuse of discretion related to the hiring process due to a failure to inform him, at the time of hire, of the chemical exposure requirement was untimely. Hebert v. DHSS, 84-0233-PC & 84-0193-PC-ER, 10/1/86
The appeal of a non-selection decision was untimely where it was filed on June 18, the date of notification was April 8, nothing in the record suggested that the effective date was on or after May 19 and the appellant had sought an explanation of the decision from the person who made the decision but had not sought reconsideration by someone with the authority to overturn the selection decision, distinguishing Adams v. DHSS, 83-0050-PC, 8/17/83. Bachman v. UW-Madison, 85-0111-PC, 11/7/85
Where the subject matter of the appeal involves an alleged omission, or failure to inform, and where there is nothing to suggest that the appellant would or should have had knowledge of the specific omission at the time it occurred, he cannot be charged with "notice" of the omission at the time it occurred. The appeal concerned the alleged failure to have informed the appellant before his appointment that the training program required exposure to MACE. Hebert v. DHSS, 84-0233-PC, 4/12/85
An appeal was held to be timely filed where it was submitted within 30 days of a letter from respondent secretary to the appellant stating that her review of a non-selection decision indicated the institution had not acted improperly, even though the institution's personnel director had some 45 days before the appeal was filed, advised appellant in writing that he had not been selected. The Commission's decision in Junceau v. DOR & DP, 82-112-PC, 10/14/82 was distinguished. Adams v. DHSS, 83-0050-PC, 8/17/83
Where following notice of her nonappointment, the appellant wrote the respondent requesting directions for appealing the method used to interview her, and the respondent's agent replied in a letter that was not inconsistent with the possibility that the matter was still pending until a future discussion between the parties, the time for appeal did not start to run until the date of that meeting. Schein v. DHSS, 79-370-PC, 5/15/80
Where the appellant, a certified applicant, was informed in May, 1979, that the position in question had been filled and that he no longer was being considered for the position, and then the appointee withdrew, the selection process was reactivated, and on August 2, 1979, another notice was sent to those certified, including the appellant, to the effect that another candidate
had been appointed, the appellant's appeal filed on August 10, 1979, was held to have been timely filed. McLlquham v. UW, 79-207-PC, 4/25/80
102.05(7) Suspension
An unsigned carbon copy of a suspension letter provided appellant with "notice" of the suspension as required by §230.34(l)(b), Stats., where there were no circumstances which raised a reasonable question as to whether the unsigned letter was genuine or was final. The 30 day appeal period commenced on the date the appellant received the unsigned letter. Hansen v. DATCP, 87-0092-PC, 10/7/87
The "effective date" of a multiple-day suspension is the first day on which the suspension became operative or valid rather than on the last day of the suspension period. Disregarding the date of notice, the appellant could have filed his appeal on the first day of the suspension period and it would not have been premature. Hansen v. DATCP, 87-0092-PC, 10/7/87
102.05(9) Exam
Where appellant did not file his appeal until more than 30 days after he was informed, verbally, that he had been eliminated from further competition as a result of a resume screen, his appeal was dismissed. There is no requirement that notice of exam results be in writing. LaRose v. UW & DMRS, 92-0229-PC, 8/26/92
The general rule is that the time for filing an appeal with respect to an examination process does not begin to run until the examinee receives notice of the results of the process because the examinee normally does not know if an exam question or other device will have an adverse effect on his or her interests until after he or she has received the exam score and/or ranking. Chaykowski v. DOD & DMRS, 91-0136-PC, 10/17/91
Applicants are not required to be given notice of either the procedure or the standards used to score a written examination. The 30 day appeal period in which to obtain review of the scores, the methods used to develop the scores and the "application" of the scores to the applicants commenced at the time the appellants received their exam results rather than at some later time. Yasick et al. v. DOT & DMRS, 89-0087-PC, 10/25/89
An appeal, filed on March 4 and relating to the examination process which resulted in the certification of eligibles for a promotional opportunity, was untimely where the appellant took the exam on January 7 & 8, was aware of the results by January 13, and by January 21 had concluded that one of the certified eligibles lacked the specific minimum training, experience and job knowledge. Holt v. DOT & DMRS, 88-0022-PC, 5/18/88
An appeal of the examination process was untimely where notice of the exam results was mailed on November 17, 1986, in order for the appeal be timely, the notice would have to have been received after November 29th and appellant did not contest respondent's assertion that appellant must have received the notice before November 29th. Royston v. DVA & DMRS, 86-0222-PC, 6/24/87
Where unsuccessful examinees filed an appeal of the classification level which had been determined for the positions in question, the time for their appeal pursuant to §230.44(3), Stats., began to run when they first learned of said classification level, as opposed to their contention that it did not begin to run until after they received notice that they had failed the examination. Smith & Berry v. DILHR & DP, 81-412, 415-PC, 9/23/82
The time for appealing examination content does not begin to run until the score is received by the examinee. Schuler v. DHSS & DP, 81-12-PC, 4/2/81
When the appellant received a notice of exam results which included the information that he had not been certified and that he was not eligible for further consideration, this was adequate notice to trigger the 30 day time limit for appeal set forth in §230.44(3), Stats., as against the appellant's arguments that the notice was ambiguous because the form stated that he was not eligible for further consideration because ten other candidates received higher scores, yet his rank was given as tenth, and that the notice allegedly did not contain adequate information for "rational decision-making" about his "vital interests, rights and guarantees. Schleicher v. DILHR & DP, 79-287-PC, 8/29/80
As to an appeal of a decision to hold an exam on an open-competitive basis, the time for appeal under §230.44(3), Stats., started to run when the appellant saw it posted on an open-competitive basis. Bresler v. UW & DP, 79-27-PC, 8/30/79
102.05(10) Actions of the Administrator/Secretary
Appellant did not meet her burden of proving she filed a timely appeal from the decision to deny her reclassification request where her letter of appeal was received by the Commission 4 days late. The reclassification denial notice had advised appellant that if she wished to "appeal this decision to the Personnel Board, you must do so in writing, within 30 days of your receipt of this memo." A cover letter to the notice suggested that if appellant had any questions, she could contact either of two people, but appellant instead took the suggestion of an unidentified person and wrote a letter of appeal to the Department of Employment Relations, where it was received within the 30 day filing period. DER then wrote the appellant and directed her to file any appeal with the Personnel Commission. Casper v. UW & DER, 96-0013-PC, 6/28/96
A timely appeal from a 1994 decision granting reclassification of appellant's position does not provide a basis for reviewing a 1990 reallocation decision that was the subject of a re-review in 1992. Milchesky v. DOT & DER, 94-0546-PC, 5/15/95
The appellant did not sustain her burden of proof that she filed her appeal within 30 days of when she received notice of a reallocation decision where the file did not contain a copy of an appeal filed within the 30 day period and appellant did not provide any other evidence of the Commission having received the appeal. The complainant stated that she had mailed her appeal within the 30 days and claimed that the Commission's recordkeeping was not infallible. Jackson-Ward v. DER, 95-0021-PC, 4/28/95
The time period for filing an appeal of a reclassification did not start until the appellant had received written notice of the decision. The Commission accepted the appellant's testimony that she had a clear recollection as to when she received the notice, this recollection was consistent with the work unit's policy and no other witnesses had a clear recollection of the events. Carlin v. DHSS & DER, 94-0207-PC, 12/22/94
Section ER 3.04, Wis. Admin. Code, requires that approvals or denials of reclassification requests shall be communicated to the employe in writing. The 30-day time limit, therefore, does not begin to run until the employe received written notice. This is true even if oral notice of the decision, as well as the effective date of the decision, occurred more than 30 days before the appeal was filed. Heath & Mork v. DOC & DER, 93-0143-PC, 6/23/94
Since notice of changes in assigned duties and responsibilities which could affect the classification of a position is required by §230.09(2)(c), Stats., to be provided in writing to the affected employe, the date from which the 30-day time limit for appeal of such new assignments should be measured is the date such written notice is received. Such notice is required for the limitations period to start in a claim of constructive demotion. Davis v. ECB, 91-0214-PC, 6/21/94
Respondents' 1993 letters to appellants, which 1) were written decisions issued in response to requests by the appellants, 2) reviewed the classification levels of the appellants' positions, and 3) affirmed the correctness of the original reallocation decisions that had been made effective in 1990 were appealable pursuant to §230.44(1)(b), Stats. The fact that appellants had failed to timely appeal the reallocation decisions in 1990 did not prohibit them from filing timely appeals from the 1993 letters. Vesperman et al. v. DOT & DER, 93-0101-PC, etc., 2/15/94
An appeal filed within 30 days of respondents' decision to "correct an error" in the classification previously assigned to a position, was timely. Holton v. DER & DILHR, 92-0717-PC, 11/29/93
Appellant failed to file any appeal of a reallocation following a survey, but subsequently requested a review of the classification level of his position. Respondent DOT replied that it would review the class level of his position in the context of reviewing a number of positions in the aftermath of the survey. Approximately two years after filing his request, respondent DOT had made no decision thereon and appellant filed an appeal withe the Commission. This appeal was untimely, because it was more than 30 days after the reallocation, and respondent DOT had not yet rendered an appealable decision on his request for classification review. While appellant could attempt to appeal a decision on that request, the current appeal must be dismissed. Mueller v. DOT & DER, 93-0030-PC, 6/23/93
The time limit for filing an appeal of a reallocation or reclassification decision does not commence until the employe has received written notice of the decision, citing Piotrowski v. DER, 84-0010-PC, 3/16/84. Lange et al. v. DOT & DER, 90-0118-PC, etc., 6/11/92
Verbal notice, provided by a co-worker, of a reclassification denial did not commence the 30 day period for filing an appeal with the Commission. Kaeske v. DER, 90-0382-PC, 11/14/91
Even though the written notice of respondent's reclassification denial was received at the appellant's place of work on September 5th, evidence showed that he did not actually receive the notice until September 21st, making his appeal filed on October 15th timely. Kaeske v. DER, 90-0382-PC, 11/14/91
Where the appellant sought to appeal a decision not to include his name on an original certification list, his letter of appeal, filed more than 30 days after he was notified of the original certification, was untimely. The appellant had been told that if there were cancellations by candidates on the original list, he would be interviewed for the position, but there was no indication that there were any cancellations or that a supplemental certification was requested. Therefore, the only personnel action placed in issue by the letter of appeal was the original certification. Stockli v. DMRS, 91-0189-PC, 11/14/91
Where the appellants received notice in approximately July of 1990 of the decisions to reallocate their positions effective June 17, 1990, they had to file any appeals within 30 days of the date of notification in order to be considered timely. The appellants also failed to pursue an opportunity to take an informal appeal to DER and the fact that a co-worker of the appellants pursued that route and subsequently received a (second) decision from DER which he timely appealed to the Commission did not permit the appellants to then file appeals relating to their own positions within 30 days of when their co-worker received the second decision. Eckdale et al. v. DER, 91-0093-PC, etc., 10/3/91
For an appeal of a decision to use a second register to fill a vacancy rather than to extend an expired register which contained the appellant's name, the effective date of the decision preceded the date the appellant was notified of the decision. The effective date was not the date the second register was actually used to fill the vacancy. In determining the effective date, it is appropriate to focus on the effect of the appealed matter on the appellant, citing Cozzens-Ellis v. Personnel Commission, 155 Wis. 2d 271, 455 N.W. 2d 246 (Ct. App., 1990). Tupper v. DMRS & DOC, 91-0009-PC, 4/18/91
Where a DOJ employe submitted an affidavit that he informed the appellant prior to July 18th of respondents' classification decision and the appellant stated in his brief that he "differed" with the affiant's view, the appellant failed to provide sufficient evidence to overcome the affidavit and sustain his burden of proof. Jellings v. DOJ & DER, 90-0369-PC, 1/24/91
Whether or not there was an insufficient request for reclassification made in 1987 as argued by DOR, the appeal was untimely filed where it was undisputed that appellant received a memo dated February 1, 1988, from DOR's Bureau of Human Resources advising him that his position was correctly classified and he did not file an appeal within 30 days after having received that memo. Lovell v. DER & DOR, 90-0240-PC, 12/13/90
An appeal of a scope of competition decision was timely, even though it was filed more than one year after the appellant was initially notified of that decision, because an appeal filed within 30 days of the date of notification would have been subject to dismissal for lack of standing in light of the fact that the decision had the effect of including rather than excluding the appellant, who at the time was an employe of DHSS. It wasn't until 1) the appellant transferred to another facility which became part of a different agency upon the subsequent creation of the Department of Corrections as a separate agency and 2) the decision to use the previously established register to fill DOC vacancies that the appellant became adversely affected by the underlying scope of competition decision. The appeal was filed within 30 days of when the appellant was notified of this injury. Augustin v. DMRS & DOC, 90-0254-PC, 11/28/90
In an effective date appeal, the Commission is not restricted to analyzing the 30 days preceding the effective date established by the respondents. Where the appellant contended that prior to filing a formal request for reclassification in 1988, she had, since 1979, frequently requested and discussed reclassification with her superiors, the scope of the effective date appeal was only limited by the the existence of a 1981 reclassification appeal, filed by the appellant, which had been dismissed by the Commission at the appellant's request. The appellant was precluded from seeking an effective date earlier than July 27, 1981, which was the date of the decision which served as the basis for the 1981 appeal. Vollmer v. UW & DER, 89-0056-PC, 4/12/90
An appeal filed on May 2, 1989 was timely where appellants were notified on or about February 9, 1989 that they would not receive reclassification to the Correctional Officer 2 level until they completed their permissive probation, i.e., May 6, 1989. The appeal was filed not more than 30 days after the effective date of the action. Larson & Timm v. DHSS & DER, 89-0046-PC, 9/8/89
Where the appellant stated that he did not know the exact date he had received a reclassification denial letter but that it was received "on or after" October 27th, the appellant did not offer any evidence that the letter was received on or after October 29th, and in order to have been timely, the letter could not have been received any earlier than October 29th, the appellant failed to sustain his burden of proof and the appeal was untimely. Look v. UW & DER, 88-0140-PC, 2/22/89
Where appellant participated in a successful group appeal of a reallocation, and then retired after the entry of the Commission decision but before the Commission's decision ultimately was upheld in judicial review proceedings and effectuated, and respondent failed to include him in the group of employes who received reallocations as a result of the ultimate implementation of the Commission's decision, and where appellant heard from third parties of the reallocation of the other employes, and of the resolution of further litigation concerning the effective date of that transaction, only several months after both events, and he then made inquiries which lead respondent DOT to advise him what had happened, it was held that there was no notification under §230.44(3), Stats., so as to start the running of the 30 days appeal period, until he received said information from respondent DOT. Thompson v. DOT & DER, 88-0037-PC, 6/29/88
An appellant cannot be charged with the duty to have inquired into the nature of the information provided as part of the certification prior to the time that the appellant knew (via the notice of his non-selection), or apparently had any reason to suspect, an adverse employment action against him. Therefore, an appeal of that part of the certification process that resulted in the appointing authority receiving a random-ordered list of names as a certification (without scores) was timely where it was filed 13 days after appellant received notice of his non-selection. To the extent the appellant sought to appeal the promulgation of the certification policy (i.e., providing the certification list in random order), the appeal was untimely because it was filed more than 2 years after the policy became effective and there was no indication that appellant was entitled to any special notification of the promulgation of the policy. However, to the extent the policy had an adverse effect on an employe in a specific transaction, each such certification made pursuant to the policy is appealable as a separate transaction. Thompson v. DMRS & DNR, 87-0204-PC, 6/29/88
An appeal filed within 30 days of a 1987 decision reallocating the appellant's position from Program Assistant 2 to 3 and setting May 10, 1987 as the effective date was timely filed irrespective of the fact that the appellant had not appealed a 1985 decision reclassifying her position from Fiscal Clerk 2 to Program Assistant 2 (rather than PA 3) effective August 18, 1985. The 1987 appeal sought an effective date of 1985. Popp v. DER, 88-0002-PC, 5/12/88
Where respondent had no responsibility of notifying the appellant, a union steward who had no involvement in the transaction, of the reclassification of a position, an appeal filed more than 30 days after the effective date of the transaction was untimely. Barker v. UW & DER, 88-0024-PC, 4/20/88
To the extent the appellant sought to challenge exam content and administration per se pursuant to §230.44(l)(a), Stats., his appeal was untimely where it was filed more than 30 days after the appellant received notice of the exam results. However, to the extent that the appellant contends that the exam process facilitated the certification and ultimate appointment of an allegedly pre-selected candidate, evidence relating to that contention would arguably be relevant in a non-selection appeal under §230.44(l)(d), Stats., and the operative date for purposes of such an appeal would be the date the appellant received notice of his non-selection. Allen v. DHSS & DMRS, 87-0148-PC, 2/12/88
An appeal of decisions regarding the relative qualifications of the candidates prior to certification and the decision not to certify the appellant for the position was held to be untimely where appellant was notified in April of 1987 that he was not certified and filed his appeal in September of 1987. The Commission declined to accept appellant's argument that he filed his appeal within 30 days of when he learned which candidates were certified for the position. Girens v. DMRS & DHSS, 87-0167-PC, 2/1/88
An appeal of a reclassification date was properly before the Commission where it was timely as to respondent UW-M's April 10, 1987 decision and the requested date of July 1, 1985 did not precede the date that UW-M became responsible, as the appointing authority, for appellant's position. The fact that the appellant sought an effective date in 1985 did not make the appeal of the 1987 decision untimely. Warda v. UW-Milwaukee & DER, 87-0071-PC, 11/4/87
In an appeal of the administrator's refusal to certify or removal from a register, appellant's "cause of action" accrues at the time the appellant receives notice of the decision. Desrosiers v. DMRS, 87-0078-PC, 8/5/87; motion for reconsideration denied, 9/10/87
An appeal of the respondent administrator's alleged failure to forward appellant's reinstatement request to appointing authorities, filed with the Commission on November 29, 1985, was untimely where in a June 10, 1985, memo, appellant stated that he believed respondent's failure to forward his applicant materials was an effort to impede his rights. Wing v. DHSS & DMRS, 85-0232-PC, 3/9/87
Where appellant submitted a written reclassification request in 1981 and received a verbal denial without any information as to how to appeal, requested a review of the matter in 1985 and received a written denial, as required by §ER-Pers 3.02(3), Wis. Adm. Code, in February 1986, her appeal within 30 days thereafter was timely filed. Spilde v. DER, 86-0040-PC, 10/9/86
Respondent had effective receipt of appellant's reclassification request where appellant submitted written request for same, notwithstanding it was submitted to her supervisor as opposed to the personnel office and did not have attached to it all the desired supporting documentation, where she was not told that she had to do anything else, and there is nothing in the civil service code or even in written agency policy requiring same. Spilde v. DER, 86-0040-PC, 10/9/86
Where appellant requested reclassification of her position in 1981 and left the position in 1983 prior to any action on her request or the establishment of an effective date for reclassification, the transaction was not rendered moot by the operation of §ER-Pers 3.03(4), Wis. Adm. Code, since this only operates if an employe leaves the position prior to the effective date of the transaction. Spilde v. DER, 86-0040-PC, 10/9/86
The reclassification appeal was untimely filed where appellant was denied her Officer 2 rating by memo dated June 7, 1984, she was promoted to Officer 3 on July 22, 1984, she learned in October of 1985 that she might have been eligible to receive her Officer 2 rating on July 18, 1984, four days before she started at the Officer 3 level, and after she was informed by respondent DHSS on November 22, 1985 that her reclass request to Officer 2 was untimely, the appellant filed an appeal with the Commission on December 9, 1985. The adverse decision appellant sought to appeal was the 1984 decision rather than the November 22, 1985 "decision." Although appellant had essentially asked the respondent in October or November of 1985 to reconsider its position on reclassifying the appellant to Officer 2 and to correct its past error, the respondent, on November 22,1985, refused to do so because the time had run for appeal of the earlier decision. LaRoche v. DHSS & DER, 85-0227-PC, 4/30/86
Where appellant initially requested reclassification in early 1983, did not receive a final decision granting the request until July of 1984, asked in August of 1984 that the reclassification be made retroactive to June of 1983 and received a denial of the request on February 21, 1985 which specifically indicated that the decision could be appealed to the Commission, appellant had 30 days from receipt of the February 21st letter to file an appeal of the effective date of her reclassification. Zahn v. DHSS & DER, 85-0040-PC, 7/17/85
Where a few days after she was notified that her position was being reclassified from Program Assistant 4 - Confidential to Management Information Technician 3, appellant was informed that her reclassification was not going to be processed until DER had a chance to consider a request to create a Management Information Technician -Confidential series, the 30 days to file an appeal did not commence until the appellant was notified that respondents had lifted the hold on the preliminary decision to process her reclassification. Kriedeman v. UW & DER, 85-0048-PC, 6/18/85
An appeal as to the proper effective date of certain reclassification decisions was timely where on November 10, 1983, appellants had filed an appeal alleging that respondent's delays in processing their reclassification requests constituted effective denial of their requests but appellants did not file a separate appeal from a January 3. 1984 notice that their positions were reclassified effective May 10, 1983. Appellants' failure to act within 30 days after the January 3rd notice amounted to a procedural failure to amend their original appeal and any such procedural failure was cured at a subsequent prehearing conference where the parties agreed that the issue for hearing was the correctness of the effective dates. Appellants were not represented by counsel. Tiffany et al. v. DHSS & DER, 83-0225-PC, 7/6/84
Pursuant to §ER-Pers 3.04, Wis. Adm. Code, the time limit for filing an appeal of a reallocation or reclassification decision does not commence until the appellant has received written notice of the decision. Piotrowski v. DER, 84-0010-PC, 3/16/84
Appeal of effective date of reclassification held to be timely where it was filed within 30 days of receipt of notice of reclassification setting May 1, 1983, as the effective date even though approximately two years earlier respondent had advised the appellant that he would not have the minimum of two years experience as an Officer I until a date in 1982. Conley v. DHSS & DP, 83-0075-PC, 9/28/83
Where the appellant failed to appeal within 30 days after he was advised by an employe in the Division of Personnel that the agency would not submit, pursuant to §Pers 12.12(3), Wis. Adm. Code, his name as a transfer applicant, along with the certification for the position in question, his appeal was untimely. O'Connor v. DMA & DP, 82-70-PC, 10/14/82
Where the appellant asked the administrator to reconsider an earlier decision, and the administrator refused because of the expiration of the time for appeal, an appeal of that refusal was not timely with respect to the earlier decision. Junceau v. DOR & DP, 82-112-PC, 10/14/82
Where unsuccessful examinees filed an appeal of the classification level which had been determined for the positions in question, the time for their appeal pursuant to §230.44(3), Stats., began to run when they first learned of said classification level, as opposed to their contention that it did not begin to run until after they received notice that they had failed the examination. Smith & Berry v. DILHR & DP, 81-412, 415-PC, 9/23/82
The time for appeal began to run when the appellant was told that her position would not be reclassified but that a new position would be created for which she would have to compete. Casper v. DHSS, 80-320-PC, 6/3/81
Where the appellant submitted a reclassification request and it was withdrawn by the agency without notice to her when she accepted a transfer, neither the withdrawal of the request nor the act of appellant leaving the position started the time for appeal to run. Shade v. DOR & DP, 79-111-PC, 11/4/80
Where the appellant's position was reclassified effective July 15, 1979, the relevant collective bargaining agreement was ratified effective November 9, 1979, with a retroactive wage adjustment calculated on the basis of his base pay on July 1, 1979, and the first pay check reflecting the new rate of pay was paid on November 29, 1979, for the pay period beginning November 4, 1979, it was held that an appeal of the effective date of the reclassification which was filed December 7, 1979, was timely, inasmuch as the reclassification was not fully effective until the appellant realized the full pay for the pay range to which his position was reclassified, and there was no way he could have known on July 15th the complete salary implications of the reclassification transaction. Marx v. DILHR & DP, 79-345-PC, 4/28/80
Where the administrator reviewed a transaction at the request of the appellant and determined that DHSS had acted properly, the time for appeal pursuant to §230.44(3), Stats., is computed with respect to the date of the administrator's decision and not with respect to the date of the agency action to be reviewed. Kaeske v. DHSS & DP, 78-18-PC, 11/22/79
102.05(13) Other subject matters
Since notice of changes in assigned duties and responsibilities which could affect the classification of a position is required by §230.09(2)(c), Stats., to be provided in writing to the affected employe, the date from which the 30-day time limit for appeal of such new assignments should be measured is the date such written notice is received. Such notice is required for the limitations period to start in a claim of constructive demotion. Davis v. ECB, 91-0214-PC, 6/21/94
The time limit for filing an application for benefits under §230.36, Stats., for a hazardous employment injury, is 14 days from the date of the injury, §ER 28.04(1), Wis. Adm. Code. This time limit is in the nature of a statute of limitations rather than a jurisdictional requirement, and does not begin to run until the employe discovers, or should have discovered under an objective standard, the relationship between the injury and his employment. Where the complainant alleges he did not become aware of a possible link between his lung disease and a source of infection among inmates with whom he worked until several months after he became aware of his diagnosis, respondent's motion to dismiss on the ground of untimely filing was denied. Rose v. DOC, 93-0180-PC, 11/30/93
Where the appellant was on a one year medical leave of absence, he commenced a disability retirement, subsequently requested return to employment status, and was informed by the respondent in July, 1976, that his employment had been considered terminated as a result of the aforesaid retirement, and that therefore reinstatement rights did not apply, and no appeal was taken, it was held that the Commission lacked the authority to review the legality of the decision to treat the disability retirement as a termination of state employment, and therefore, the appellant could not attack the legality of that separation through an appeal in 1979 of the denial in that year of a request for reinstatement. (Note: this case addresses, as dictum, the question of whether acceptance of a disability annuity operates to terminate state employment, and suggests that it does not.) Chapman v. DILHR, 79-247-PC, 8/19/80; affirmed by Dane County Circuit Court Chapman v. State Pers. Comm., 80-CV-5422, 9/8/81)
Where the appellants filed an appeal in 1979 with respect to a failure to pay overtime in 1977, and were met with a motion to dismiss for untimely filing, one of their alternative arguments was that their appeal ran not to the 1977 failure to pay overtime but to the decision of the administrator in 1979 to pay overtime to certain other employes in compromise and settlement of an appeal that they had timely filed in 1977. The Commission held that this decision was not in effect a decision not to pay the appellants and that since they were not parties to the other appeal, the decision did not affect adversely their substantial interests and they lacked standing to appeal it. Wickman v. DP, 79-302-PC, 3/24/80
While this digest has been prepared by Personnel Commission staff for the convenience of interested persons, it should be remembered that the decisions themselves are the ultimate source of Commission precedent.